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In antitrust enforcement as in  cost-benefit analysis, neoclassical economics may be 
interpreted as arguing for the use of a “total welfare” standard whose implementation 
treats transfers as welfare-neutral.  Several recent papers call for antitrust agencies to 
move in the direction of t his version of a total welfare standard for enforcement.  
However, as Williamson (1968) noted, horizontal mergers typically result in transfers 
that may greatly exceed in magnitude any deadweight loss or efficiency gain, so that a 
decision to ignore transfers may be quite important.  I argue that such transfers are likely 
overall to be quite regressive, and thus that a consumer surplus standard rather than a 
total welfare standard may be appropriate for antitrust.  Two common arguments against 
this standard  – that most mergers are in markets for intermediate goods, and that a 
consumer welfare standard implies a tolerance for monopsony – are examined and found 
wanting.  I argue in addition that, even if a total welfare standard is used, both the finance 
literature on merger outcomes and the structure of the U.S. enforcement agencies suggest 
that the use of a consumer surplus standard by the agencies is more likely to achieve that 
goal. 
 
JEL codes:  D02, D31, G34, K21, L40 The discussion of the proper welfare standard for antitrust enforcement – with a 
focus on merger analysis – continues.  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the U.S. 
agencies spell out an enforcement standard that is arguably close to a consumer surplus 
standard, focusing on the effect of a merger on  the prices paid by customers and 
emphasizing the desirability of efficiencies that lower marginal costs and thus are likely 
to have a direct impact on post-merger prices.
1  However, recent papers by Heyer (2006) 
and Carlton (2007) argue forcefully for the orthodox standard of neoclassical economics, 
total welfare:  consumer surplus plus producer surplus, with transfers canceling each 
other out.  Ross and Winter (2005) also argue for total surplus, but at least in part because 
they believe that accounting for transfers by adding additional weight to changes in 
consumer surplus would generally not change things much  – assuming that the weight 
chosen is appropriate.   
 
On the other hand, other recent papers – for example, Lyons (2002), Neven and 
Röller (2005), and Fridolfsson (2007) – more or less accept total welfare as the outcome 
standard for enforcement but suggest that, given various factors in the process of merger 
investigation and enforcement, a total-welfare-maximizing outcome might be more likely 
to result from an agency’s use of consumer surplus rather than total welfare as its own 
standard.
2  Farrell and Katz (2006) conclude a detailed discussion of both perspectives 
with a divided judgment between total vs. consumer surplus as a standard  – as we 
“muddle along until we understand more” – though they also join Foer (2006) in urging 
continued focus on the process of competition as an equally important end and standard 
in itself. 
 
  The current paper presents one factor that arguably supports consumer surplus 
rather than total welfare as the outcome standard and follows with two factors supporting 
the argument that, even if one prefers total welfare as the outcome standard, a consumer 
surplus standard on the part of the enforcement agency is the best way to get there.  In 
particular, I will argue that 
 
•  It is both appropriate and workable to include distribution factors in the general 
(but not the specific) analysis of mergers; 
•  Both the industrial organization and (especially) the finance literature cast some 
doubt on the tempting economists’ assumption that because firms themselves 
propose mergers, we may assume that these mergers will increase at least the 
producer surplus portion of total welfare; and 
•  If the enforcement agency pursues total welfare as its standard, the outcome of the 
process in the U.S. and other countries is likely to be significantly biased in favor 
of producer surplus rather than total welfare. 
 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission,  Commentary on the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, March 2006. 
2 As Kaplow and Shapiro (2007) summarize the argument:  “[The enforcement agencies’] adopting a 
consumer welfare standard may induce firms to undertake deals that obtain potential synergies while 
causing less harm to competition, leading to even higher total welfare than would a total welfare standard.”  
See also Brito and Catalão-Lopes (2006).   2
1.  The Welfare Outcome of Mergers:  Must We Really Ignore Distribution? 
 
“Who are you gonna believe?  Me, or your lyin’ eyes?” 
Richard Pryor 
 
In the paper most often cited in support of total surplus as the standard for antitrust 
enforcement, Williamson (1968) points out that “the income redistribution which occurs 
[as a result of a merger] is usually large relative to the size of the deadweight loss.”  
Thus, notes Williamson, “attaching even a slight weight to income distribution effects 
can sometimes influence the overall valuation significantly.”  My own analysis of one 
proposed U.S. rail merger (Pittman, 1990) may serve as an example:  in the proposed 
merger of the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific Railroads in the mid 1980s, I estimated that 
transfers from shippers to the merged railroad would be anywhere from twice to five 
times the value of the direct welfare loss, depending on the assumptions made regarding 
certain demand and cost parameters.  And yet the use of total welfare as a merger 
standard, combined with the refusal of mainstream neoclassical economics to consider 
assigning differing values for the marginal utility of income at different income levels, 
forces us to ignore these sometimes large transfers of income and wealth as beyond our 
concerns and/or specialized expertise.
3  Must we really be so detached from these 
transfers? 
 
After all, it  is difficult to ignore the rather plain evidence that, on average, firm 
owners are better off than final consumers – especially the owners of firms large enough 
to be subject to agency merger review – and that pure transfers from final consumers to 
owners, which are ignored as the total welfare standard is generally applied but included 
in a consumer surplus standard, are overwhelmingly likely to be regressive.  
(“Regressive” is of course a value-laden term; readers who do not share the author’s 
assumption  that a dollar redistributed from the rich to the poor is in general welfare-
enhancing will likely not be persuaded by what follows.) 
 
Regarding owners vs. consumers broadly, the aggregate pattern of ownership of 
corporate assets in the US is not much in dispute – and it certainly does not appear to be 
changing in the direction of less inequality.  Using data from the most recent Survey of 
Consumer Finances from the Federal Reserve Board, Bucks, et al. (2006) report that 
“ownership of any type of bond is notably concentrated among the highest tiers of the 
income and wealth distribution,” and that 
 
The direct ownership of publicly traded stocks is more widespread than the direct 
ownership of bonds, but, as with bonds, it is also concentrated among high-income 
and high-wealth families. 
 
Kennickell (2006) elaborates: 
 
In 2004, slightly more than one-third of total net worth was held by the wealthiest one 
percent of families….  The next-wealthiest nine percent of families held 36.1 percent 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Musgrave (1959), Harberger (1971), and Kaplow (2004).   3
of total wealth….  Families in the bottom half of wealth distribution … held only 2.5 
percent of total wealth….
4 
 
In other words, we can be pretty confident that, as a general matter, transfers of 
income and wealth to the owners of large firms from individual customers are transfers 
from the less to the more well off. 
 
Farrell and Katz (2006), and others, would not, I think, dispute such points.  
However, they argue against an enforcement agency’s taking distributional 
considerations into account in merger analysis with what may be summarized as four 
points: 
 
•  It would be very difficult to learn enough to take distribution into account in 
particular merger cases. 
•  “Owners and workers of firms are people too” – Heyer even claims to have seen 
them shopping – so that it is not clear why one should favor one group of people 
as consumers over another as producers.  Furthermore, for some products like 
luxury goods it is very likely the case that customers are better off than workers 
(though not necessarily better off than owners). 
•  Many  – perhaps most – mergers involve intermediate goods, whose sellers and 
buyers are both firms.  “We are aware of no evidence that the wealth distribution 
of shareholders varies systematically according to a firm’s place in the value 
chain.” 
•  Finally, there is a logical “division of labor among public policies:  if antitrust 
enforcement and some other public policies focus on total surplus, other public 
policies can redistribute that surplus in accord with notions of fairness.”  (In fact 
the argument for this kind of division of labor goes back at least to Musgrave 
[1959].) 
 
The first point is a strong one, but it clearly argues only against efforts to analyze the 
distributional consequences of individual merger proposals; it does not relate to the 
proposal in this paper to consider distributional concerns more generally.  Farrell and 
Katz in fact point out – though they are arguing a different point – that “in the face of 
transactions costs, it is desirable to implement policies that work well on average (rather 
than exactly case by case) even when one has strong distributional preferences.”  And of 
course antitrust enforcers (and courts) use similar reasoning every day in their per se 
prohibition of cartel agreements:  though no one denies that there are situations (such as 
countervailing power against a monopolist) where the formation of a cartel may improve 
welfare, those situations are considered insufficiently important to outweigh the strong 
presumption that in general, cartels harm welfare, so that detailed examination of every 
                                                 
4 Kennickell further notes that, while the first two of these figures have been stable in recent years, the 
share held by families in the bottom half “is significantly [below] … the … estimates for 1995, 1998, and 
2001.” Furthermore, “African Americans overall are 23.3 percentage points less likely to have direct or 
indirect holdings of publicly traded stocks than all families; Hispanics are 28.3 percent less likely.” 
   4
cartel agreement would impose investigative and adjudicative costs exceeding their social 
value. 
 
Why, then, should we not conduct merger investigations as if most transfers from 
customers to owners are regressive, rather than treating them as benign by assumption? 
 
It is true, as Farrell and Katz note, that a good deal of merger activity takes place in 
markets for intermediate goods.  It may be that we can say nothing about the 
progressivity or regressivity of transfers between different groups of owners, but that is 
not the end of the story.  As everyone who has ever conveyed doubts about the existence 
of free lunches will agree, in general cost increases – in this case, the merger-induced 
transfers – get passed along.  They may or may n ot get passed along 100 percent, but 
under most circumstances a significant portion are passed along.  In their valuable paper 
that (among many other things) reviews the literature on this topic in the taxation and 
international trade arenas, Röller, et al. (2000) suggest as a summary result “that pass-on 
roughly varies between 30% and 70%,” depending of course on a variety of 
circumstances.
5  Generally the (derived) demand curves for intermediate inputs are likely 
to be inelastic – purchasers will be relatively unresponsive to price increases so long as 
their competitors face the same increases – and thus pass-on in this context should be at 
the high end of that range.
6  Heyer notes that 
 
Where final demand is inelastic and pass-through is likely to be nearly complete, 
intermediate goods customers may (correctly) believe that they will not be very much 
harmed by even a substantial post-merger increase in the price of what they buy.  
Final consumers, of course, are unambiguously harmed. 
 
It seems fully appropriate, then, to treat transfers to sellers from purchasers of 
intermediate goods as indirect but real transfers to sellers of intermediate goods from the 
final consumers of the goods that embody those intermediate goods. 
 
In turn, this issue leads to a response to arguments that “if only consumers matter, 
then a buying cartel should be perfectly legal and indeed should be encouraged.”
7  This 
may be true regarding buying cartels formed by final consumers, but it does not apply in 
the vast majority of merger cases that involve intermediate goods.  As Schwartz (1999) 
notes, if a monopsonist lacks market power when it sells, the monopsony has no impact 
on downstream customers; the entire harm from the monopsony is the upstream welfare 
loss.  If the monopsonist has market power when it sells, the low monopsony price that it 
                                                 
5 See also the theoretical discussion in Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983). 
6 Indeed it is the relative inelasticity of the derived demand curve for the intermediate product that yields 
the common outcome of merger-induced transfers far exceeding merger-induced deadweight welfare 
losses. 
7 Carlton (2007).  See also Heyer (2006) (“It is worth noting that literal application of a pure consumer 
welfare standard … would appear to immunize consumer buyer groups that exert efficiency-reducing 
monopsony power over sellers.  I suspect that many supporters of a consumer welfare standard for sellers 
would be uncomfortable applying its logic equally to the buyer side of the market.”) and Kaplow and 
Shapiro (2007) (“If only consumer welfare mattered, increases in buyer power through horizontal mergers 
and otherwise might be praised, not condemned.”).   5
pays for inputs is not passed along to its customers, and so on downstream; on the 
contrary, it is the output reduction and associated welfare loss that are passed on, so that 
final consumers suffer rather than benefit.
8  It is only in the case of a buying cartel among 
final consumers that the arguments in this section would seem to imply approval rather 
than disapproval of monopsony, and in this case, if the sellers possess market power then 
the cartel would not be condemned unambiguously even under a total surplus standard.  
In general, then, arguments for consumer surplus as a merger standard that are based on 
the ultimate effects of mergers on final consumers – as in this section of this paper – do 
not imply a tolerance for monopsony. 
 
We may conclude, then – subject to many caveats about our confidence in particular 
theories and findings – that the transfers from customers to owners that result from some 
horizontal mergers are typically regressive, and that such transfers are likely to passed 
along to final customers to a significant degree even if they originate in intermediate 
goods markets.  I do not consider here the Schumpeterian argument that on balance 
market power is a good thing, because monopoly profits are a necessary incentive to 
innovation and the “creative destruction” that is capitalism at its most productive, except 
to note the strong theoretical and empirical argument that this effect is weakened or even 
reversed at a sufficiently high level of market power.
9  Nor do I consider the objectivist 
argument that regressive transfers of income may be a good thing in general, for similar 
reasons. 
 
I would argue, however, that it does not seem very satisfying or comforting to note 
that  whenever total welfare increases, income redistribution policies  could make 
everyone better off as a result (Kaplow, 2004)  – if in fact they do not.  The 
“compensation principle” (Viscusi, et al., 2005) does not pay the rent.  One may be 
happier when changes in government policies reduce the disparities of income and wealth 
within the U.S. (not to mention the world), but until that happens it seems quite 
reasonable to argue that those making and enforcing other public policies, like antitrust 
enforcement, s hould, to the degree manageable, take into account the distributional 
implications of their actions.  And this would seem to argue in favor of a standard for 
merger and other antitrust enforcement focusing on consumer surplus rather than total 
welfare, as the latter is generally applied – that is, in favor of a merger standard centered 
on the effect of the merger on (quality-adjusted) price. 
 
Ross and Winter (2005) point out that, while in the Williamsonian tradeoff a total 
welfare standard implies a weighting of increases in producer surplus equal to the 
weighting of increases in consumer surplus and a consumer surplus standard implies a 
weight of zero for producer surplus, one can imagine intermediate weighting schemes as 
well.  They argue, however, that antitrust should give no greater priority to income 
redistribution than other government policies do, and that, based on their analysis, the 
policies of the Canadian government – the focus of their case study – favor redistribution 
                                                 
8 Correspondingly, as Schwartz points out, we do not expect suppliers to monopolists to benefit from the 
high monopoly prices charged to the customers of the monopolist; rather, the suppliers suffer from the 
monopolistic output reduction. 
9 See, for example, Gilbert (2005).   6
only on behalf of the very poorest members of society, as opposed to generally from the 
richer half (for example) to the poorer half.  When they translate this policy into the 
weighting of transfers from consumers to producers generally, it does not much change 
the equal weighting scheme implied by a total welfare standard. 
 
The main problem with this line of thinking may be that the introduction of a 
weighting between zero and one for producer surplus reduces the predictability of 
enforcement by allowing enforcer discretion in the choice of weights.
10  Ross and Winter 
report some success in Canada with a methodology of solving for the weight which 
would cause an enforcement decision to change and then considering whether that weight 
seems reasonable, but that strategy certainly does not eliminate the problem.  The more 
comprehensive answer from the Ross and Winter paper  – that a proper weight for 
producer surplus would not be all that different from one, anyway – seems completely 
specific to the authors’ analysis of broader Canadian distribution policies; I know of no 
comparable analysis for the U.S. or other countries. 
 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission use a standard that is close to a consumer surplus standard – favoring, 
for example, the inclusion of efficiencies into the analysis when said efficiencies are 
likely to be 
 
sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, 
e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.  (Guidelines at §4) 
 
However, they make at least a nod in the direction of total surplus in the stated 
willingness of the agencies to consider, “in their discretion”, significant efficiencies that 
are not likely to be passed along in the form of lower prices for the affected product, 
including both efficiencies in different markets and savings in fixed costs.  In the latter 
case, the agencies note that “consumers may benefit from [these reductions in fixed costs] 
over the longer term even if not immediately”.
11  Carlton (2007) bases his case for total 
welfare on the longer term benefits of cost savings, especially as these lead to 
technological improvements. 
 
It may be worth noting here that Williamson (1968) himself expresses some 
reservations about ignoring distributional concerns – though, to be sure, in the end he 
does come down in favor of doing just that.  He begins by making the “division-of-labor” 
in government policy argument himself, suggesting that “income distribution objectives 
… [fall] more clearly within the province of taxation, expenditure, and transfer payment 
activities.”  Nevertheless, he also argues that  
 
The transfer involved could be regarded unfavorably not merely because it 
redistributes income in an undesirable way (increases the degree of inequality in the 
size distribution of income), but also because it produces social discontent.  This 
                                                 
10 I thank Dennis Carlton for suggesting this point to me. 
11 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, March 2006, at §4.   7
latter has serious efficiency implications that the … [traditional] analysis does not 
take explicitly into account. 
 
He concludes this portion of his paper with  the observation that “distinguishing social 
from private costs in this respect may … be the most fundamental reason for treating 
claims of private efficiency gains skeptically.” 
 
2.  How Much Deference Should One Give to the Assumption that Mergers Are 
(at least) Privately Profitable? 
 
“Assume a virtue, if you have it not.” 
Hamlet 
 
  The economist’s natural reaction to a proposed merger goes something like the 
following.  If a company proposes a takeover, or two companies propose a merger, we 
can assume that this transaction will be at least privately profitable.
12  This assumption 
will of course not turn out to be correct every time, but given information asymmetries 
and private incentives, we can assume that it will be profitable more often than not, and 
certainly more often than if the government second-guessed such private decision-
making.  Enforcers should then examine the likely effects of the merger on customers, 
but with the assumption that the fact of the merger itself implies a positive effect on at 
least the producer surplus portion of total welfare. 
 
  Unfortunately, the support from the empirical literature for this set of benign 
assumptions about merger motivations and outcomes is not particularly strong.  There is 
by now a fairly extensive literature examining merger outcomes:  a smaller industrial 
organization literature that relies mostly on accounting data, a much larger finance 
literature that relies mostly on stock market data.  A surprisingly large number of studies 
in both areas come to the following conclusions: 
 
•  The stockholders of acquiring firms on average do not benefit, or do not benefit 
much, from mergers. 
•  The stockholders of acquired firms tend to enjoy significant gains from mergers. 
•  The balance of these two forces is probably a small overall efficiency gain from 
mergers – though even this is uncertain. 
•  These patterns vary, to some degree systematically, with the types of merger 
transactions. 
 
                                                 
12 Heyer (2006):  “Certainly the merging firms believe that they will be better off, as evidenced by the fact 
that they have chosen to merge, presumably, voluntarily.”  See also Farrell and Shapiro (1990) (“Since any 
proposed merger is presumably privately profitable, it will also raise welfare if it has a positive external 
effect [on consumers and on nonparticipant firms].”) and Kaplow and Shapiro (2007) (“The law implicitly 
presumes mergers to be advantageous to some degree….Setting the threshold of anticompetitive effects 
significantly above zero may be rationalized by the view that mergers typically generate some synergies, so 
they should not be prohibited unless the reduction in competition is sufficiently great.”).   8
The first result alone should give us pause concerning deference to the forecasts and 
incentives of acquiring firms:  presumably even if the net effect ends up positive, it was 
not the intention of the (stockholders of the) acquiring firm to hand over most or all of the 
value of this gain to the (stockholders of the) acquired firm.  And yet this seems to be the 
dominant empirical finding. 
 
Among the studies reporting this outcome are Mandelker (1974), Varaiya and Ferris 
(1987), Bruner (2002), and Moeller, et al. (2004).
13  (Dissenting voices include Andrade, 
et al. [2001] and Kaplan [2006].)  Andrade, et al. (2001) express well the problems raised 
by these findings: 
 
A … challenge to the claim that mergers create value stems from the finding that 
all of the gains from mergers seem to accrue to the target firm shareholders.  We 
would like to believe that in an efficient economy, … mergers would happen for 
the right reasons, and that their effects would be, on average, as expected by the 
parties during negotiations.  However, the fact that mergers do not seem to benefit 
acquirers provides reason to worry about this analysis. 
 
  The first, third and fourth results together raise the obvious question, why would 
firms engage in mergers that on average fail to increase profits?  One answer may be the 
same as the answer to the classic microeconomic question as to why rational consumers 
would buy both lottery tickets and insurance:  even if lottery tickets are on average a 
losing proposition, the small possibility of a very high return may act as an incentive for 
participation.  Correspondingly, even though – for example – the AOL/Time Warner and 
Daimler-Benz/Chrysler combinations turned out badly, the parties may have been betting 
on the small possibility of a transformationally successful outcome. 
 
A number of more specific explanations have been proposed in the literature and 
found to have empirical support, many relying on the classic problem of the separation of 
ownership and control that goes back to Berle and Means (1932).  Roll (1986) suggests a 
“hubris” hypothesis, with managers (and, possibly, their shareholders) overestimating the 
degree to which they can improve the operations of acquired assets.  Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988) suggest an “empire building” hypothesis, noting that the remuneration of top 
managers is more closely related to the size of the assets that they manage than the return 
that those assets earn.  Gorton, et al. (2005), noting the empirical regularity that larger 
firms are less often acquired, suggest a motive of acquiring a smaller competitor in order 
to make the firm too large to be easily acquired by a larger competitor, while Fridolfsson 
and Stennek (2005 and 2006) suggest a motive of acquiring the assets of a smaller 
competitor before one’s competitors can acquire those assets.
14 
 
                                                 
13 See also Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), and the general discussion in Scherer (2006). 
14 Incidentally, this theory suggests a weakness in the common assumption that a decline in the stock price 
of competitors following a merger announcement indicates that the merger will result in efficiencies.  
Fridolfsson and Stennek argue that this effect may simply reflect the market’s reaction to the failure of the 
competitors to successfully purchase the acquired firm themselves.   9
  The fact that returns to mergers vary systematically with characteristics of the 
transaction seems to support these or related hypotheses.  Gondhalekar,  et al.  (2004) 
show that “free cash flow” in the acquiring firm is associated with overpaying for the 
acquired firm, while Bargeron, et al. (2007) show that publicly held firms are more likely 
to overpay than privately held firms.  Andrade, et al. (2001) show that acquirers who 
issue stock to finance an acquisition lose money on average, though they argue that this is 
largely due to the information disclosed by the issuance of the stock rather than to the 
acquisition itself.  (Amihud, et al. [1990] suggest that this difference in returns to stock-
financed acquisitions may be limited to those firms with low managerial ownership.)  
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show that acquirers that are “glamour” firms (low book-to-
market) systematically lose money with their acquisitions, in contrast to “value” acquirers 
(high book-to-market) that systematically gain.  Porter (2005) cites the “strategy 
literature” as demonstrating that “smaller, focused acquisitions are more likely to 
improve productivity than mergers among leaders.”  Other studies have found a “negative 
correlation between acquirer announcement returns and both acquirer size … and the size 
of the merger transaction … a s well as … worse acquirer returns in defensive 
acquisitions…” (Gorton, et al., 2005). 
 
  Again, the idea here is decidedly not that enforcement agencies should second-
guess the decisions of firms to merge; if firms do not forecast the profitability outcomes 
of mergers well, enforcement agencies would do much worse.  Nor is the point that 
enforcement agencies should be systematically more inclined to challenge those types of 
acquisitions that have been shown on average not to create value for the acquired firms – 
though it might be worth considering such a policy, especially if its likely effect were on 
average to discourage deals that reflect the furtherance of manager utility rather than the 
increase of shareholder value. 
 
Rather, the idea is that, if firms do not in fact forecast the profitability outcomes of 
mergers well, the agencies should not adopt the default assumption that a merger would 
enhance the producer surplus portion of total welfare simply because the firms have 
proposed it; nor should the agencies put much stock in the existence or magnitude of 
efficiencies claimed by merging parties in their negotiations with the agencies.  As Porter 
(2005) summarizes, “We cannot assume that a merger will be efficient and profitable just 
because companies propose it.”  And this leads us to the conclusion that if the analysis of 
the impact of a merger on competition and consumer surplus is what agencies and courts 
do best, that analysis is what they should rely on in deciding whether to challenge a 
merger. 
 
3.  Is a Total Surplus Agency Goal the Best Way to Achieve a Total Surplus 
Process Outcome? 
 
“By indirections find directions out.” 
Hamlet 
 
  As noted above, there is a growing literature that examines the issue of the best 
standard for antitrust enforcement in t he context of the process of enforcement  – in   10
particular, in merger enforcement, the clear and clearly relevant facts that a) firms choose 
which mergers to propose and b) agencies (and courts) are in some ways at a significant 
information disadvantage as compared to the merging firms.  Among the most important 
papers, Besanko and Spulber (1993) and Lyons (2002) – both ably discussed by Farrell 
and Katz (2006)  – emphasize the incentives of the firms to choose among merger 
possibilities on the criteria of producer surplus only, so that a corresponding bias on 
behalf of consumer surplus at the enforcement agencies may be the most likely strategy 
to achieve an outcome favoring both producer and consumer surplus.  (There may be 
some parallel between the advantage of the firms in proposing the merger and the 
advantage gained by the member of a committee or legislature who controls the agenda; 
see, e.g., Mueller [2003].)  Fridolfsson (2007) explicitly outlines a scenario in which a 
consumer surplus bias at the agencies leads firms to consider alternative merger partners 
and/or strategies that they would have not considered otherwise. 
 
Unfortunately the existing literature on the topic of how the U.S. antitrust 
agencies choose which mergers to challenge – as well as other enforcement actions – is 
not very satisfying.  Masson and Reynolds (1977) point out the methodological flaws in 
the literature of the pre-Guidelines period, and my own paper (1992a) argues that the 
more recent literature claiming to demonstrate significant political influences on micro-
level enforcement decisions of the agencies is badly flawed.  More recently, Baker and 
Shapiro (2007) present data suggesting that the U.S. agencies – and the Antitrust Division 
in particular – have been considerably less likely to challenge mergers under the George 
W. Bush administration than under the Clinton and George H.W. Bush administrations. 
 
  But consider two potentially simpler issues:  the internal structure of an 
enforcement agency, and the fact that, for the most part and for most of the past quarter 
century, the heads of the agencies have sought to act as neutral judges rather than as 
aggressive prosecutors.  I believe that these two factors act to bias the decisions of the 
agencies against merger challenges and other enforcement actions – which may suggest, 
as with Besanko and Spulber (1993) and Lyons (2002), that some countervailing bias, 
such as a focus on consumer surplus rather than total welfare, is appropriate even if the 
object is an outcome maximizing  total welfare.  I will focus here on the Antitrust 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 
  Within the Antitrust Division there are sections of lawyers organized either by 
economic sector ( e.g. the Telecommunications and Media Enforcement Section, the 
Transportation, Energy, and Agriculture Section), by type of investigation and violation 
(the National Criminal Enforcement Section), or by geography (the seven Field Offices).  
These “legal sections” are in turn supported by three “economic sections”, groups of 
economists who work with the lawyers as part of investigative teams but who report their 
analyses and recommendations to their own (economist) section chiefs. 
 
  Section chiefs of legal and economic sections report to Deputy Assistant 
Attorneys General (“deputies”), who are assisted by “directors of operations”.  Deputies 
report to the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust (the AAG), who makes the 
enforcement decisions.   11
 
  An argument to challenge a proposed merger is, by its nature, a somewhat frail 
creature within the Antitrust Division jungle.  A judgment by both the legal and 
economic staffs that a proposed merger should not be challenged is rarely overruled by 
the two section chiefs involved.  A decision by both the legal and economic section chiefs 
that a proposed merger should not be challenged is rarely overruled by the legal and 
economic deputies.  And a decision by both the legal and economic deputies that a 
proposed merger should not be challenged is rarely overruled by the AAG.  For the m ost 
part, “no challenge” is the default outcome. 
 
  Public Choice economists and students of bureaucracy will respond that Antitrust 
Division lawyers are not random draws from the population.  Lawyers who apply for 
work at the Antitrust Division are more likely to believe in its mission that those who do 
not.  (Though in fact the majority of new Division attorneys have applied for a position at 
only the Department of Justice rather than a particular Division thereof, still a) one could 
argue a general pro-enforcement bias on the part of applicants to the Department, and b) 
there remains the issue of which young attorneys offered jobs by the Division choose to 
accept.)  Furthermore, Division lawyers arguably advance their careers and increase their 
human capital by getting a case into a courtroom.  (I suggest elsewhere [Pittman, 1992b] 
that it is difficult to argue seriously that Division economists – or, for that matter, FTC 
economists – are biased in favor of challenging mergers.) 
 
  However, I would maintain  that this (arguable) bias at the staff level is far 
outweighed by the notable lack of bias (arguably) at the section chief level and (reliably) 
at the deputy and AAG levels.  This is a point apparently not much addressed in the 
literature.  Coate, et al. (1990) and Coate (2005) demonstrate the importance of perceived 
objective factors such as concentration and entry barriers in leading to FTC merger 
challenges; these findings seem consistent with a lack of bias at the decision-making 
level of the sister agency of the Antitrust Division.  (See also the discussion in Leary 
[2002], arguing for an intertemporal continuity of basic enforcement decisions at the two 
agencies.)  In related literature, Glaeser, et al. (2000) suggest that both public interest and 
career furtherance are factors in certain decisions of federal drug enforcers, and this 
seems consistent with Posner’s (2003) observation that the “aspirations for higher office 
or well-paying private employment” of the heads of administrative agencies “are 
enhanced if they earn a reputation for efficiency”. 
 
I think most experienced observers would agree that at the Antitrust Division, 
both deputies – legal and economic – and AAGs typically think and reach decisions in 
the mode of adjudicators rather than prosecutors.  If they decide to go to Federal district 
court to challenge a merger, they want to win the challenge, but they challenge only those 
mergers that they believe, on the merits, should be challenged. 
 
  But note what all of this means for the outcome of the Division’s decision-making 
process.  Even if Division attorneys are biased towards a merger challenge – even if 
Division attorneys and legal section chiefs together are biased toward a merger challenge 
– they are certainly no more so biased than the lawyers of the merging companies are   12
biased against a challenge.  (The rare formal and organized complaint by a competitor of 
the merging companies does not change this larger picture.) 
 
  But if, as I argue, the deputies and the AAG are not biased, this m eans that a 
recommendation to challenge at the staff level that is a close call on the merits has only 
about a 50% chance of making it past the deputies, and then only a 50% x 50% = 25% 
chance of making it past the AAG to an actual challenge.  An unbiased Federal district 
court judge reduces the chances of the merger being successfully blocked to 50% x 25% 
= 12.5%.  (The reader can do the math regarding appeals.) 
 
  The broader point is a straightforward one.  If deputies, the AAG, and the 
judiciary constitute three sequential decision makers seeking to maximize total welfare, if 
there is little appeal from a first or second level decision not to challenge but a strong 
appeal to a decision at any level to challenge, then the system is going to be biased in the 
direction of not blocking mergers, including mergers that would reduce total welfare.  
Some may argue that this laissez-faire sort of bias is appropriate.  Others may respond, 
with Porter (2002), that existing accounting and tax conventions already provide artificial 
incentives for mergers.  In any case, if the desired outcome is one that maximizes total 
welfare, the analysis in this section suggests – in the same spirit as Besanko and Spulber 
(1993) and Lyons (2002) – that the best process to achieve that goal is more likely one 
where the enforcer seeks to add to the mix a bias in favor of consumer surplus.  This is of 
course a fortiori the case if, as I have argued above, the desired outcome should be one of 
the maximization of consumer surplus rather than total welfare as traditionally applied. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
Mergers have a significant impact on the U.S. economy.  When mergers are 
horizontal, they may reduce competition in such a way as to transfer large sums of money 
to the merged firm (and its competitors) from their customers.  Conventional neoclassical 
economics treats these transfers as welfare-neutral, but I have argued that as a whole they 
are quite likely to be regressive and thus (arguably) welfare-harmful.  This does not mean 
that enforcement agencies and courts should seek a detailed analysis of the distributional 
consequences of each horizontal merger.  It does suggest, however, that enforcers and 
courts may assume that, on balance, such transfers are harmful rather than neutral (or 
“potentially” neutral), and use a consumer surplus standard in evaluating mergers, 
seeking to block those likely to result in price increases to customers.  Note that this does 
not mean that estimates of efficiencies must always be ignored; a consumer surplus 
standard  inherently includes any marginal cost reductions that are passed along to 
customers. 
 
As noted above, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice 
and Federal Trade Commission elaborate an enforcement standard that is arguably close 
to a consumer surplus standard, focusing on the effect of a merger on the prices paid by 
customers, emphasizing the desirability of efficiencies lowering marginal costs so that 
they may have a direct impact on post-merger prices, and examining claims of 
efficiencies presented by the merging firms with great care.  Thus the argument in this   13
paper is not really for a change in the status quo, and I do not argue strongly against the 
taking account of efficiencies in limited circumstances that is favored by the Guidelines 
and the recent Commentary thereto.  However, several recent papers have called for the 
adoption of a total welfare standard rather than (close to) a consumer surplus standard, 
emphasizing in part the desirability of treating transfers as welfare neutral.  It is this 
proposed change  – which would, all else equal, lead to less stringent U.S. merger 
enforcement – against which I am specifically arguing. 
 
Furthermore, it is clear from the finance literature that acquiring firms are poor 
predictors of the impacts of mergers on their shareholders.  On average, acquiring firms 
in certain categories – and perhaps acquiring firms in general – do not benefit from the 
deals  – though of course the managers who instigated the deals may benefit.  This 
suggests strongly that, on average, the estimates of efficiencies prepared for the agencies 
by the acquiring firms are not to be trusted, even if the firms themselves believe them.  
(As noted above, Williamson urged “skepticism” regarding these estimates, especially the 
degree to which they reflect public rather than private efficiencies.)  And this means that 
even agencies seeking to maximize total welfare should focus on the impact of the 
merger on customers, without trying to factor in the inherently unreliable firm forecasts 
of cost reductions, except perhaps in very special circumstances. 
 
Finally, the structure of the Antitrust Division – and, I suspect, the FTC – is biased 
against merger challenges.  At each level, a recommendation not to challenge is likely to 
prevail, while a recommendation to challenge faces a strong appeal from the parties in 
front of generally neutral top agency management.  Under these circumstances, an 
attempt by the agencies to maximize total welfare will lead to the challenge of too few 
mergers.  A decision rule that seeks to maximize consumer surplus is more likely to lead 
to decisions to challenge at a level maximizing total welfare.   14
 
   
References 
 
Amihud, Yakov, Baruch Lev, and Nickolaos G. Travlos, “Corporate Control and the Choice of 
Investment Financing:  The Case of Corporate Acquisitions,” Journal of Finance 45 (1990), 603-
616. 
 
Andrade, Gregor, Mark Mitchell, and Erik Stafford, “New Evidence and Perspectives on 
Mergers,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 15 (2001), 103-120. 
 
Baker, Jonathan B., and Carl Shapiro, “Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement,” 
prepared for the Kirkpatrick Conference on Conservative Economic Influence on U.S. Antitrust 
Policy, Georgetown University Law School, April 2007. 
 
Bargeron, Leonce, Frederik Schlingemann, Rene M. Stulz, and Chad Zutter, “Why Do Private 
Acquirers Pay So Little Compared to Public Acquirers?”, NBER Working Paper 13061, April 
2007. 
 
Berle, Adolph A., and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New 
York:  MacMillan, 1932. 
 
Besanko, David, and Daniel F. Spulber, “Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy,” 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 9 (1993). 
 
Brita, Duarte, and Margarida Catalão-Lopes,  Mergers and Acquisitions:  The Industrial 
Organization Perspective, Kluwer Law, 2006. 
 
Bruner, Robert F., “Does M&A Pay?  A Survey of Evidence for the Decision-Maker,” Journal of 
Applied Finance (2002), 48-68. 
 
Bucks, Brian K., Arthur B. Kennickell, and Kevin B. Moore, “Recent Changes in U.S. Family 
Finances:  Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances,” Federal Reserve 
Bulletin 92 (February 2006). 
 
Bulow, Jeremy I., and Paul Pfleiderer, “A Note on the Effect of Cost Changes on Prices,” Journal 
of Political Economy 91 (1983), 182-185. 
 
Carlton, Dennis W., “Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?”,  Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 21 (2007), forthcoming. 
 
Coate, Malcolm B., “Twenty Years of Federal Trade Commission Merger Enforcement Activity 
(1985-2004),” Potomac Working Paper in Law and Economics 05-02, October 2005. 
 
_____, Richard S. Higgins, and Fred S. McChesney, “Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger 
Challenges,” Journal of Law and Economics 33 (1990), 363-482. 
 
Farrell, Joseph, and Michael L. Katz, “The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust,” 
Competition Policy International 2 (2006), 3-28. 
   15
_____, and Carl Shapiro, “Horizontal Mergers:  An Equilibrium Analysis,” American Economic 
Review 80 (1990), 107-126. 
 
Foer, Albert A., “The goals of antitrust:  thoughts on consumer welfare in the US,” in Philip 
Marsden, ed.,  Handbook of Research in Trans-Atlantic Antitrust, Cheltenham, UK:  Edward 
Elgar, 2006. 
 
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof, “A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control,” in Vivek Ghosal and 
John Stennek, eds., The Political Economy of Antitrust (Contributions to Economic Analysis, vol. 
282), Elsevier 2007. 
 
_____, and Johan Stennek, “Why Mergers Reduce Profits and Raise Share Prices – A Theory of 
Preemptive Mergers,” Journal of the European Economic Association 3 (2005), 1083-1104. 
 
_____, and _____, “Industry Concentration and Welfare – On the Use of Stock Market Evidence 
from Horizontal Mergers,” discussion paper #5977, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
London, December 2006. 
 
Gilbert, Richard J., “New Antitrust Laws for the ‘New Economy’?”, testimony before the 
Antitrust Modernization Commission, Washington, DC, November 8, 2005. 
 
Glaeser, Edward L., Daniel P. Kessler, and Anne Morrison Piehl, “What Do Prosecutors 
Maximize?  An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes,” American Law and Economics 
Review 2 (2000), 259-290. 
 
Gondhalekar, Vijay B., R. Raymond Sant, and Stephen P. Ferris, “The Price of Corporate 
Acquisition:  Determinants of Cash Takeover Premia,” Applied Economics Letters (2004), 735-
739. 
 
Gorton, Gary, Matthias Kahl, and Richard Rosen, “Eat or Be Eaten:  A Theory of Mergers and 
Merger Waves,” NBER working paper 11364, May 2005. 
 
Harberger, Arnold C., “Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics:  An Interpretive 
Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature 9 (1971), 785-797. 
 
Heyer, Ken, “Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis:  Why Not the Best?”, Competition Policy 
International 2 (2006), 29-54. 
 
Kaplan, Steven N., “Mergers and Acquisitions:  A Financial Economics Perspective”, prepared 
for the Antitrust Modernization Commission Economist’s Roundtable on Merger Enforcement, 
January 19, 2006. 
 
Kaplow, Louis, “On the (Ir)Relevance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to 
Government Policy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (2004), 159-175. 
 
_____,  and Carl Shapiro, “Antitrust,” working paper 12867, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, January 2007; forthcoming in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds., 
Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, 2007. 
 
Kennickell, Arthur B., “Currents and Undercurrents:  Changes in the Distribution of Wealth, 
1989-2004,” unpublished paper, Federal Reserve Board, August 2006.   16
 
Leary, Thomas B., “The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States,” Antitrust Law 
Journal 70 (2002), 105-140. 
 
Lyons, Bruce R., “Could Politicians Be More Right than Economists?  A Theory of Merger 
Standards,” University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition and Regulation Working Paper 
CCR 02-1, May 2002. 
 
Mandelker, Gershon, “Risk and Return:  The Case of Merging Firms,” Journal of Financial 
Economics 1 (1974), 303-335. 
 
Masson, Robert T., and Robert J. Reynolds, “Statistical Studies of Antitrust Enforcement:  A 
Critique,”  American Statistical Association Proceedings (Business and Economic Statistics 
Section), 1977, part 1. 
 
Musgrave, Richard A., The Theory of Public Finance, New York:  McGraw-Hill, 1959. 
 
Mueller, Dennis, Public Choice III, New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
Neven, Damien J., and Lars-Hendrik Röller, “Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political 
economy model of merger control,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 23 (2005), 
829-848. 
 
Pittman, Russell W., “Railroads and Competition:  The Santa Fe/Southern Pacific Merger 
Proposal,” Journal of Industrial Economics 34 (1990), 25-46. 
 
_____, “Antitrust and the Political Process,” in David B. Audretsch and John J. Siegfried, eds., 
Empirical Studies in Industrial Organization:  Essays in Honor of Leonard W. Weiss, Boston:  
Kluwer, 1992a. 
 
_____, Review of  Antitrust Policy and Interest Group Politics, by William F. Shughart, II, 
Review of Industrial Organization 7 (1992b), 91-95. 
 
Porter, Michael, “Competition and Antitrust:  A Productivity-Based Approach”, in Charles 
Weller, ed., Unique Value:  Competition Based on Innovation Creating Unique Value, Innovation 
Press, 2005. 
 
Posner, Richard A., Economic Analysis of Law, 6
th ed., New York:  Aspen, 2003. 
 
Rau, P. Raghavendra, and Theo Vermaelen, “Glamour, Value, and the Post-Acquisition 
Performance of Acquiring Firms,” Journal of Financial Economics 49 (1998), 223-53. 
 
Ravenscraft, David J., and F.M. Scherer,  Mergers, Sell-offs, and Economic Efficiency.  
Washington:  Brookings, 1987. 
 
Roll, Richard, “The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers,” Journal of Business 59 (1986), 
197-216. 
 
Röller, Lars-Hendrik, Johan Stennek, and Frank Verboven, “Efficiency Gains from Mergers,” 
working paper #543 (2000), Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm. 
   17
Ross, Thomas W., and Ralph A. Winter, “The Efficiency Defense in Merger Law:  Economic 
Foundations and Recent Canadian Developments,” Antitrust Law Journal 72 (2005), 471-503. 
 
Scherer, F.M., “A New Retrospective on Mergers,” Review of Industrial Organization 28 (2006), 
327-341. 
 
Schwartz, Marius, “Buyer Power Concerns and the Aetna-Prudential Merger,” presented at the 4
th 
Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, October 
20, 1999. 
 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, “Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (1988), 7-20. 
 
Varaiya, Nikhil P., and Kenneth R. Ferris, “Overpaying in Corporate Takeovers:  The Winner’s 
Curse,” Financial Analysts Journal 43 (1987), 64-70. 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, John M. Vernon, and Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Economics of Regulation and 
Antitrust, 4
th ed., Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 2005. 
 
Williamson, Oliver E., “Economies as an Antitrust Defense:  The Welfare Tradeoff,” American 
Economic Review 58 (1968), 18-36. 
 